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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VANDA HOLMAN NAYLOR, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
MELVIN CHARLES NAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
14680 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in 
favor of Plaintiff and Respondent and against Defendant 
and Appellant, dated May 25th, 1976. 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge 
F I L E D 
NOV 1 - 1976 
s. 
CUrk, Sup/omt Court, UUK 
Nolan J. Olsen 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
Joseph R. Howell 
732 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
L. J. Barclay 
Suit 111 Atlas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VANDA HOLMAN NAYLOR, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
"
vs
~ 14680 
MELVIN CHARLES NAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of May 25, 1976 in which the Court gave Vi of the 
real property and the water stock connected therewith to the Plaintiff and Respondent, and 
the other Vi to the Defendant and Appellant. That on or about the month of July or 
August, 1956 the Plaintiff and Respondent employed the firm of Barclay and Barclay to 
obtain a Decree of Divorce for her. Defendant and Appellant signed a waiver of 
appearance. That all of the personal property had been divided and agreed as to the value 
between the parties. That the parties owned one acre of land the description of which is set 
forth in the complaint, the Findings Of Fact, and Conclusions Of Law and Decree Of 
Divorce. That upon September 19, 1956 Plaintiff and Respondent was granted a Decree of 
Divorce from the Defendant and Appellant, based upon the waiver of appearnace signed by 
the Defendant and Appellant. The Plaintiff and Respondent brought to the office the legal Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
description of the property that she was to receive, and the description of the property that 
the Defendant and Appellant was to receive, including the legal description of the property 
that he purchased from Plaintiff and Respondent. Plaintiff and Respondent brought to the 
office a Memorandum of what the parties had agreed upon as to the operation of the 
remaining property, which was known as the business property on South State Street, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. The Plaintiff and Respondent was advised by her Counsel, L. 
J. Barclay, to wait until the Decree of Divorce became final before signing the Warranty 
Deeds, Bills of Sale and agreement as to the operation of the business property. This was 
agreed to by both parties. Both parties agreed to the division of the real estate, that the lot 
to the West of the acre was valued at $2,000.00 and that either party could buy the other 
out. Plaintiff and Respondent chose to sell her interest to Defendant and Appellant for the 
sum of $1,000.00. The next lot to the East had a duplex on it in which the Plaintiff and 
Respondent lived in and rented the other side. The next lot to the East was taken by the 
Defendant and Appellant. It was agreed between the parties that both lots were of equal 
value. The one that Plaintiff and Respondent obtained and the one that Defendant and 
Appellant obtained. The remaining property East of the 3 lots was business property on 
South State Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The business property was to be held 
and operated jointly. That upon June 26, 1957 the Plaintiff and Respondent signed a 
Warranty Deed to Defendant and Appellant covering the lot that he was to receive, plus the 
description of the lot at the West end of the acre, that Plaintiff and Respondent sold her 
interest to the Defendant and Appellant. That the said Warranty Deed was notarized by 
Lawrence J. Barclay and the Witness thereon was David Barclay. That the said Warranty 
Deed was Recorded in the Office of the Recorder for Salt Lake County, State of Utah upon 
July 16, 1957. That Defendant and Appellant has been paying the taxes on the two parcels 
of land ever since the 26th day of June 1957. That upon June 26, 1957 Defendant and 
Appellant signed a Warranty Deed to the property on which the Plaintiff and Respondent 
Duplex was located, which the Plaintiff and Respondent Recorded in the Recorders Office 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah upon the 22nd day of August, 1957, and has been 
paying taxes on the said property ever since June 26, 1957. The Warranty Deed was 
~~ • ' * *
 T T
 u~-"i*« O«H thp witness thereon was David Barclay. That each 
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party owned a Vi interest in the business property which was located on South State 
Street, Midvale, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and each party paid Vi of the operating 
expenses, Vi of the taxes and received Vi of the profits, if there were any. Nothing was said 
by the Plaintiff and Respondent, whatsoever, about the foregoing transactions until 
January 3, 1975, when the Price Rentals, Inc., a Utah Corporation bought the entire acre. 
Plaintiff and Respondent gave a Warranty Deed to Price Rentals, Inc., a Utah Corporation 
for the property contained in the Warranty Deed of June 26, 1957 given to her by 
Defendant and Appellant, plus the Vi interest in the business property on South State 
Street, Midvale, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Defendant and Appellant gave a 
Warranty Deed to Price Rentals, Inc., a Utah Corporation upon January 3, 1975 for the 
property as set out in the Warranty Deed from Plaintiff and Respondent to Defendant and 
Appellant dated June 26, 1957, plus his undivided Vi interest in the business property 
located on South State Street, Midvale, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. It had been agreed 
by and between the Plaintiff and Respondent and the Defendant and Appellant, that 
Plaintiff and Respondent should receive 29 and Vi per cent of the net sale of the 1 acre of 
land. That the Defendant and Appellant was to receive 70 and Vi Per cent of the net sale 
price of the 1 acre of land. That Plaintiff and Respondent has already received $25,000.00 
plus her interest in the water stock, which she sold. Based upon the agreement between the 
Plaintiff and Respondent and Defendant and Appellant that Plaintiff and Respondent was 
to receive 29 and Vi per cent of the sale price. Plaintiff and Respondent would be entitled to 
$29,352.50 minus the $25,000.00. 
That the Divorce complaint of the Plaintiff and Respondent filed September 17, 1956 
contains the following in paragraph 5. b. "That the parties hereto have to their mutual 
satisfaction made division between themselves of all personal property owned by them". 
That the Findings Of Fact in the Divorce Case of the Plaintiff and Respondent was signed 
September 19, 1956 contains in paragraph 5. b. the following, 'That the parties hereto have 
to their mutual satisfaction made division themselves of all personal property owned by 
them." 
That the plaintiff and Respondent was to receive the following personal property at the 
agreed value thereof: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
VALUE 
1. Inside Furniture $332.00 
2. Buick Automobile $150.00 
3. Kenmore Range $ 50.00 
$532.00 
That the Defendant and Appellant was to receive the following personal property at the 
agreed value thereof: 
VALUE 
1. All Outside Equipment $435.00 
2. All Barbering Equipment $280.00 
3. All Fishing Equipment $ 35.00 
4. Portable Clothes Closet $ 27.50 
5. Rug $ 50.00 
$827.50 
That there was a difference of $295.50, the difference of what Plaintiff and Respondent 
received and what the Defendant and Appellant received. The parties agreed to cut the 
$295.50 in half, and each receive the sum of $147.75. 
That the office of Barclay and Barclay never did, at any time, represent the Defendant 
and Appellant in the Divorce action of the Plaintiff and Respondent. Plaintiff and 
Respondent brought to the office the descriptions of the real property and to whom it was 
to be Deeded to. Plaintiff and Respondent brought to the office of Barclay and Barclay 2 
written memos as to the personal property and the value thereof and to whom it should go. 
Plaintiff and Respondent brought to the office of Barclay and Barclay a written memo 
containing the agreement of the parties as to the operation of the business property located 
at South State Street, Midvale, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. That a written agreement 
be prepared for her signature, and the signature of the Defendant and Appellant, which was 
done. It was from the descriptions of the real property, the lists of the personal property 
and the memo of the operation of the business, that 2 Warranty Deeds were prepared, 2 
Bills of Sale were prepared and a written AgreementWas prepared. The Warranty Deeds, the 
Bills of Sale and the Agreement were signed by the Plaintiff and Respondent and the 
Defendant and Appellant upon the 26th day of June, 1957 at the office of the Attorneys 
and Counselors at Law for Plaintiff and Respondent. Both parties were present in person. 
L. J. Barclay, of the firm of Barclay and Barclay delivered to Plaintiff and Respondent 
in the month of August, 1956 $1,000.00 for the lot at the west end of the One Acre lot, and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
$147.75 as the difference in the value of the personal property, making a total of $1,147.75. 
Plaintiff and Respondent refused to sign any papers, whatsoever, until she received the 
$1,147.75 from L. J. Barclay, her Attorney and Counselor at Law. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter came on for trial upon the 14th day of May, 1976 at the hour of 10:00 
o'clock A.M. before Judge Stewart M. Hanson. Just prior to the opening of the Court 
Nolan J. Olsen, Attorney and Counselor at Law, for the Plaintiff and Respondent was in 
the office of Judge Stewart M. Hanson for what reason, I know not. Sufficient is it to say 
that when Judge Stewart M. Hanson took the bench he stated I know all about the case. At 
that time he held in his hand the file of the original Divorce action to-wit: Vanda Holman 
Naylor, Plaintiff -vs- Melvin Charles Naylor, Defendant; Civil Case No. 109,889, which 
contained a description of the only real estate that the parties, owned one acre plot. 
At that time Judge Stewart M. Hanson asked L. J. Barclay the former Attorney in the 
Divorce action of the Plaintiff and Respondent what he was doing in this case, which L. J. 
Barclay responded that he was here to protect the integrity of his office, his deceased 
Brother David Barclay and himself. That he knew all about the entire transactions, to which 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson responded I know all about the case and you do not have to stay. 
You can go back to your office and take care of your Legal work, to which L. J. Barclay 
responded I am going to stay and be a witness as to what really happened. Judge Stewart M. 
Hanson then said there should be an exclusion of the witnesses. To which Nolan J. Olsen 
Counsel for the Plaintiff and Respondent stated I want the witnesses excluded and I was put 
out in the hall. 
Isabel Barclay, Secretary for L. J. Barclay, remained in the Court room because she 
was not a witness. Judge Stewart M. Hanson stated Isabel take him back to his office or to 
dinner but get him out of here. To which Isabel Barclay stated no we are going to stay here 
we have to much at stake. 
Counsel Joseph R. Howell was taken by surprise when Counsel for Plaintiff and 
Respondent admitted she had signed the Warranty Deed from her to the Defendant and 
Appellant on the 26th day of June, 1957. From the inception of this case the Plaintiff and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondent has denied that the signature upon the Warranty Deed from her to the 
Defendant and Appellant was not her signature and was a forgery. That it was not the 
signature of the witness David Barclay, and that Lawrence J. Barclay did not Notarize the 
Warranty Deed. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff and Respondent stated to the Defendant and Appellant that it 
was not her signature, although Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent stated in and out of 
Court that Plaintiff and Respondent is getting old, is senile and very forgetful. Counsel still 
continued to advise Plaintiff and Respondent that it was not and could not be her signature 
upon the Warranty Deed given by her to the Defendant and Appellant. 
During a recess Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent told L. J. Barclay, former 
Counsel in the Divorce action of the Plaintiff and Respondent, that the signature on the 
Warranty Deed from Plaintiff and Respondent to Defendant and Appellant of June 26, 
1957 was O. K., and that he, L. J. Barclay did not have to wait to be a witness, there upon 
L. J. Barclay told Counsel for the P/aintiff and Respondent that he intended to be a witness 
and would be a witness. 
L. J. Barclay was called as a witness for Defendant and Appellant by his Attorney, 
Joseph R. Howell. The transcript from Page 61 to Page 70 inclusive contains the testimony 
with some corrections of L. J. Barclay under oath. L. J. Barclay was never cross-examined 
by the Court or Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent, therefore it is a fair assumption that 
all of the testimony contained therein is true and correct. The humorous remarks made by 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson have been left out of the transcript, for example David Barclay 
was at the Stock Exchange, and L. J. Barclay was at the grocery store. 
That on or about May 14, 1976 the memorandum of Judge Stewart M. Hanson was 
received by Counsel for Defendant and Appellant, Joseph R. Howell, in which he states 
that L. J. Barclay, former Counsel for the Plaintiff and Respondent was misled, he also 
states that it was a hoax on the part of the Defendant and Appellant. 
It seems strange that Judge Stewart M. Hanson stated that he had known L. J. Barclay 
for over 50 ^ eg^and* never at anytime questioned his honesty, integrity and professional 
conduct. That Nolan J. Olsen stated that he had known L. J. Barclay for 17 years and had 
npvpr nnestioned his honesty, integrity and professional conduct. Yet in this case neither Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Judge Stewart M. Hanson nor Nolan J. Olsen listened and believed L. J. Barclay. 
It is a well known fact in the legal profession that Judge Stewart M. Hanson listens to 
Attorneys without the apposing Attorney being present, and then makes his decision. The 
trial of this case was a farce because Judge Stewart M. Hanson had made his decision 
before he heard the case. Nolan J. Olsen Attorney for the Plaintiff and Respondent was 
well aware of Judge Stewart M. Hanson's attitude. Judge Stewart M. Hanson and Nolan J. 
Olsen, Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent had a field day in their questions and answers 
of the Defendant and Appellant. 
Prior to the filing for a motion for a new trial L. J. Barclay became associated with 
Joseph R. Howell Counsel for the Defendant and Appellant. Upon the 18th day of June, 
1976 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock A.M. the motion for a new trial was argued before Judge 
Stewart M. Hanson. When Judge Stewart M. Hanson took the bench he stated in open 
Court to L. J. Barclay that he would not change his mind. L. J. Barclay presented the 
motion for a new trial together with numerous exhibits to up hold his contention for a new 
trial to Judge Stewart M. Hanson. Judge Stewart M. Hanson refused to listen and stated in 
open Court that he would not look at and examine the exhibits. 
The Plaintiff and Respondent and her Counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, seem to have very little 
regard for the truth. First, they claim that L. J. Barclay was not her Attorney, when the 
record shows that he was her Attorney. Second, she claimed that she did not sign the 
Warranty Deed from her to Defendant and Appellant upon the 26th day of June, 1957, that 
it was a forgery. That Lawrence J. Barclay did not notarize the said Warranty Deed and 
neither did David Barclay witness the same. Plaintiff and Respondent finally admitted that 
it was her signature upon the Warranty Deed from her to the Defendant and Appellant. 
That it was notarized by Lawrence J. Barclay and witnessed by David Barclay. This was 
done when she was put under oath. Third, Plaintiff and Respondent denied that she signed 
a Bill of Sale from herself to the Defendant and Appellant upon the 26th day of June, 1957, 
and signed in the presence of DAvid G. Barclay but finally admitted under oath that she 
had signed the Bill of Sale. Fourth, Plaintiff and Respondent set forth in her complaint that 
she and Defendant and Appellant were going to resume their martial status, which was 
denied by Defendant and Appellant and whirh nm/^ r *™u - i — ™***- ~ • • — 
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Respondent stated that she had to take care of her eight grand-children, which is false 
because of the fact that their father is well able to care for them, and is taking care of them. 
Sixth, the list of personal property, put in evidence, was made out after the filing of this 
action. Seventh, Plaintiff and Respondent claimed that she lived in a chicken coupe the fact 
of the matter is that it was built into a duplex, which was 30 years ago. Eighth, Plaintiff and 
Respondent states that she has no money the fact of the matter is that she has received 
$25,000.00 on real property and $350.00 for the sale of one share of water stock and rent 
from one-half of the duplex that she lived in for 19 years. Nineth, Ture Defendant and 
Appellant and Plaintiff and Respondent spoke with each other because they were operating 
the business property together. Tenth, the picture of Plaintiff and Respondent and 
Defendant and Appellant does not indicate that they went back to live with each other. The 
fact of the matter is that most of the matters presented to the Court had no bearing upon 
the real legal issues as to the signing of the Warranty Deeds, Bills of Sale and the 
Agreement, but was for the purpose of clouding the legal issues and obtaining sympathy for 
the Plaintiff and Respondent. A check of the deposition given by the Plaintiff and 
Respondent will prove the fact to be that Plaintiff and Respondent togehter with her 
Counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, were pleading for sympathy. 
Upon the 16th day of July, 1957 the Defendant and Appellant recorded in the Office of 
the Recorder for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Warranty Deed made, executed and 
delivered to him by the Plaintiff and Respondent upon the 26th day of June, 1957. Upon 
the 22nd day of August, 1957 the Plaintiff and Respondent recorded in the Office of the 
Recorder for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Warranty Deed made, executed and 
delivered to her by the Defendant and Appellant upon the 26th day of June, 1957. Thus 
there was only one piece of property left to-wit: The business property located upon South 
State Street, Midvale, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, covered by an agreement as to its 
operation dated June 26, 1957. The letter dated August 31, 1957 to Mrs. Vanda Naylor was 
in answer to her question as to the operation of the business property, which was the only 
property that they held jointly. Judge Stewart M. Hanson refused and ignored and would 
not allow L. J. Barclay to explain the dates that the Warranty Deeds were recorded, nor the 
agreement between the Plaintiff and Respondent and the Defendant and Appellant as to the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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operation of the only piece of property left that had not been disposed of but was to be 
operated jointly. 
Plaintiff and Respondent is well aware of the fact that for 19 years she paid the taxes 
on the land which her duplex was located, which was deeded to her by Defendant and 
Appellant upon the 26th day of June, 1957 and recorded by her upon the 22nd day of 
August, 1957, in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Plaintiff and Respondent is well aware of the fact that she and Defendant and Appellant 
paid the taxes, each Vi, upon the business property located on South State Street, Midvale, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. That she at no time paid any taxes, whatsoever, upon the 
property deeded by her to the Defendant and Appellant upon the 26th day of June, 1957 
and recorded by him upon the 16th day of July, 1957, in the Office of the County Recorded 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, for Plaintiff and Respondent could have acquainted himself 
with this entire situation if he had so desired. First by checking the records of the County 
Recorders Office for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Two, by contacting Robert Van 
Sciver who was the former Attorney for the Plaintiff and Respondent in this matter. Third, 
by calling the Office of L. J. Barclay, who would have been very glad to explain the entire 
transaction to a fellow Attorney. 
Plaintiff and Respondent and her Counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, wants One-half of the 
purchase price of the original one acre of land, which Judge Stewart M. Hanson in his 
decision was to the effect that she be given One-half of the purchase price of the original 
one acre of land. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment order of May 25th, 1976 and the 
dismissal of this action. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Upon the 19th day of September, 1956 the plaintiff obtained a Decree Of Divorce, 
based upon a waiver from the defendant, signed by Judge Stewart M. Hanson. The 
Findings Of Fact contains the following, 'That the parties hereto have to their mutual 
satisfaction made division between themselves of all personal property owned by them." 
The only real estate owned by the plaintiff and the defendant was a one acre plat described 
as follows to-wit: 
Commencing 52 Rods North and 11.9 Rods East from the East VA Corner 
of SEction 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; 
thence North 4 Rods; thence West 40 Rods; thence South 4 Rods; thence 
East 40 Rods to the point of beginning. 
Both parties agreed to the division of the real estate as follows: That plaintiff would 
retain the duplex where she was residing and renting the other side. Defenent prepared, 
executed and delivered a Warranty Deed of said property to plaintiff. 
Commencing 52 Rods North and 11.9 Rods East from the EV4 Corner 
of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian 
and at a point which is 212 Feet and 9 Inches West from said point 
of commencement; thence North 4 Rods; thence WEst 150 Feet; Thence 
South 4 Rods; thence East 150 Feet to point of beginning. 
Subject to a Right Of Way over the South 14 Feet thereof. 
Subject to existing Mortgage thereon and also subject to Easements and 
Rights of Way for Gas, Water and Sewer Lines. 
Plaintiff recorded the Warranty Deed in 1957 and has been paying the property tax 
upon said property each and every year together with any and all encubrances thereon. 
The defendant was to receive the following described property: 
Commencing 52 Rods North and 11.09 Rods East from the EXA Corner 
of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 WEst, Salt Lake Meridian 
and at a point which is 83 Feet and 9 Inches West from said point of 
commencement; thence North 4 Rods; thence West 129 Feet; thence 
South 4 Rods; thence East 129 Feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to a Right Of Way over the South 14 Feet thereof. 
The parties agreed upon the sum of $2,000.00 as the value of the said described 
property: 
Commencing 52 Rods North and 11.9 Rods East From the EV4 Corner of 
Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian and 
at a point which is 362 Feet and 9 Inches West from said point of 
commencement; thence North 4 Rods; thence West 297 Feet 3 Inches; 
thence South 4 Rods; thence East 297 Feet 3 Inches to pont of beginning. 
Subiect to existing Mortgage thereon and also subject to Easements and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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fcither one could purchase the others Equity in said property. Defendant paid plaintiff 
$1,000.00 for her Equity in said real property. That defendant paid the Mortgage and all 
encumbrances upon said property. That defendant built a duplex upon said property. That 
defendant lived in one side and rented the other side. That plaintiff prepared, Executed and 
delivered a Warranty Deed to the defendant of the above described property that he was to 
receive, plus the above described property that he purchased from the plaintiff for the sum 
of $1,000.00. Defendant recorded the said Warranty Deed in the month of July, 1957, and 
has been paying the taxes thereon ever since. 
That the only remaining property was the business property that faced on South State 
Street, Mid vale, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which is described as follows: 
An undivided Vi interest in and to the following described property: and each party was 
to pay Vi of the taxes. 
Beginning at a point 52 Rods North and 11.9 Rods East from the East 
quarter corner of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, running thence North 4 Rods; thence West 83 feet 9 Inches thence 
South 4 Rods; thence East 83 feet 9 Inches to the point of Beginning. 
Each party owned an undivided Vi interest in said described real property. 
That on or about the 3rd day of January, 1975 the plaintiff sold her interest to the 
real property by Warranty Deed to Price Rentals, Inc., a Utah Corporation. 
Commencing 52 Rods North and 11.9 Rods East from the E!4 Corner of 
Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian and at a 
point which is 212 Feet and 9 Inches West from said point of 
commencement; thence North 4 Rods; thence West 150 Feet; thence 
South 4 Rods; thence East 150 Feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to a Right of Way over the South 14 Feet thereof. 
Subject to existing Mortgage thereon and also subject to Easements and 
Rights Of Way for Gas, Water and Sewer Lines. 
An undivided Vi interest in and to the following property: 
Beginning at a point 52 Rods North and 11.9 Rods East from the East 
quarter Corner of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, and running thence North 4 Rods; thence West 83 Feet 9 
Inches; thence South 4 Rods; thence East 83 Feet 9 Inches to the point of 
Beginning. 
Subject to easements, restrictions, reservations and rights of way appearing 
of record or enforceable in law and equity and taxes for the year 1975 and 
thereafter. 
That on or about the 3rd day of January, 1975 the defendant sold his interest to the 
real propertv bv Warr^ntv n**A +~ r>-:~~ ™—* * 
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Beginning at a point 52 Rods North and ll.y Koas nasi irum mc uaau 
quarter corner of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and at a point which is 83 Feet 9 Inches West from said point 
of beginning, and running thence North 4 Rods; thence West 129 Feet; 
thence South 4 Rods; thence East 129 Feet to the point of Beginning. 
Beginning at a point 52 Rods North and 11.9 Rods East from the East 
quarter corner of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and at a point which is 362 Feet 9 Inches West from said point 
of beginning, and running thence North 4 Rods; thence West 297 Feet 3 
Inches; thence South 4 Rods; thence East 297 Feet 3 Inches to the point 
of Beginning. 
An undivided Vi interest in and to the following described property: 
Beginning at a point 52 Rods North and 11.9 Rods East from the East 
quarter corner of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and running thence North 4 Rods; thence West 83 Feet 9 Inches; 
thence South 4 Rods; thence East 83 Feet 9 Inches to the point of beginning. 
Subject to easement, restrictions, reservations and rights of way appearing 
of record enforceable in law and equity and taxes for the year 1975 and 
thereafter. 
That the land sold by the plaintiff and the defendant to Price Rentals, Inc., a Utah 
Corporation was all the real property owned by the plaintiff and the defendant, which was 
the one acre plat as set out in the original Divorce Complaint of the plaintiff, the Findings 
Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
That the interest of the plaintiff was figured as 291/2 Per cent of the sale price according 
to the tax records. 
That the interest of the defendant was figured as lOVi Per cent of the sale price 
according to the tax records. 
This figure was based upon the real property taxes being paid by the plaintiff and the 
defendant. 
That the plaintiff agreed to this division of 29Vi Per cent to her and lOVi Per cent to 
the defendant. Plaintiff changed her mind after consulting with her present Counsel, and 
then demanded One-Half of the sale price of the One Acre of land. 
That the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to the division of the personal property and 
the value thereof. The plaintiff received the following personal property: 
VALUE 
1. Inside Furniture $332.00 
2. Buick Automobile $150.00 
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i nai me aeienaant received the following personal property: 
VALUE 
1. All Fishing Equipment $ 35.00 
2. All Barber Ship Equipment and Tools $280.00 
3. All Outside Equipment, Cement Miser, 
Wheel Barrow, Truck Trailer House, Boat 
and Carpenter Tools $435.00 
4. One Portable Clothes Closet $ 27.50 
5. One Rug $ 50.00 
Total: $827.50 
That the difference in the value of the personal property received by the defendant was 
$295.50, plaintiff and defendant agreed to divide the $295.50 One-Half to the plaintiff and 
One-Half to the defndant to-wit: $147.75. 
That the Decree of Divorce between the plaintiff and the defendant as signed by Judge 
Stewart M. Hanson upon the 19th day of September, 1956. At that time the Decree Of 
Divorce would not become final until 6 months after the 19th day of September, 1956. Then 
then Counsel for the plaintiff advised plaintiff that it would be better to have the Warranty 
Deeds and Bill of Sales be signed after the Decree Of Divorce became final. 
That plaintiff brought to the office of her former Attorney the descripton of the real 
property that she would receive, and the description of the real property that the defendant 
was to receive. She also brought the description of the business property on South State 
Street which they were to operate together. She also brought 2 lists of the personal property 
that she and the defendant were to receive, and the value thereof that the plaintiff and the 
defendant had agreed upon. 
Nothing was said about the Execution of the Warranty Deed from the plaintiff to the 
defendant, and the Bill of Sale from the plaintiff to the defendant both Instruments having 
been Executed upon June 26, 1957, until Price Rentals, Inc., a Utah Corporation offered to 
buy the entire acre, which included plaintiff's interest and the defendants and their joint 
interest. This offer was made in the Fall of 1974. 
Plaintiff employed Robert Van Sciver an Attorney and Counselor at Law to examine 
the entire transaction of the Warranty Deed from her to the defendant, the Warranty Deed 
from the defendant to her, the agreement to operate the business property jointly, the Bill 
of Sale of the personal property from plaintiff to the defendant, and the Bill Of Sale of the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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personal property of the defendant to the plaintiff. All 4 Instruments were made, Executed 
and Delivered to plaintiff and defendant upon June 26, 1957. Attorney Robert Van Sciver 
informed the plaintiff that the entire transaction of June 26, 1957 was proper and legal. 
That plaintiff then employed Attorney Nolan J. Olsen of Midvale, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. He informed her that the signature upon the Warranty Deed dated June 26, 
1957 from her to the defftdant was not and could not be her signature. He also informed the 
plaintiff that the signature upon the Bill of Sale of the personal property from her to the 
defendant was not and could not be her signature. 
Plaintiff came to the Office of her former Attorney and denied her signature on the 
Warranty Deed and the Bill Of Sale both dated June 26, 1957 from her to the defendant. 
Plaintiff admitted under oath that it was her signature upon the Warranty Deed and the Bill 
Of Sale both from her to the defendant. 
That the defendnat paid into the office of the former Attorney for the plaintiff in the 
month of August, 1956 the sum of $1,000.00 as her One-Half of the agreed purchase price 
of the real property deeded by her to the defendant. That the defendant paid into the office 
of the former Attorney for the plaintiff, in the month of August, 1956 the sum of $147.75 
as agreed upon by plaintiff and defendant, as the difference in the value in the personal 
property. 
That in the month of August, 1956 the former Attorney paid to the plaintiff the sum of 
$1,147.75. That the plaintiff denied receiving the $1,147.75 from her former Attorney, but 
she finally admitted under oath that she did receive the $1,147.75. 
That the water stock in question was already in the name of the defendant. Plaintiff 
agreed with her former Attorney that the water stock should go with the real property which 
she had sold her One-Half interest to the defendant for the sum of $1,000.00 to-wit: 
Commencing 52 Rods North and 11.9 Rods East from the EV4 Corner of 
Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian and at a 
point which is 362 Feet and 9 Inches West from said point of commencement; 
thence North 4 Rods; thence West 297 Feet 3 Inches; thence South 4 Rods; 
thence East 297 Feet 3 Inches to point of beginning. Subject to existing 
Mortgage thereon and also subject to Easements and Rights Of Way for Gas, 
Water and Sewer Lines. 
That at the time the Divorce was entered on September 19, 1956 there was a mortage of 
*
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Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law and the Decree Of Divorce. That plaintiff and defendant 
each agreed to pay Vi of the $1,900.00 mortgage, which they did pay. 
That Plaintiff and Respondent received one-half of the rentals of the business property 
which they held and managed jointly to-wit; the sum of $175.00 per month for a period of 
19 years, when she sold her interest to Price Rentals, Inc., a Utah Corporation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The lower Court erred in awarding a judgment to the Plaintiff and Respondent for the 
reason the Plaintiff and Respondent had given a Warranty Deed to Defendant and 
Appellant dated June 26th, 1957 and recorded July 16th, 1957. Defendant and Appellant 
had given Plaintiff and Respondent a Warranty Deed dated June 26th, 1957 and recorded 
August 22nd, 1957, and signed an agreement for the operation of the business property 
located on South State Street, Midvale, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Plaintiff and 
Respondent signed a Warranty Deed on or about the 3rd day of January, 1975 to Price 
Rentals, Inc., a Utah Corporation for the property that Defendant and Appellant deeded to 
her upon the 26th day of June, 1957, plus her one-half interest in the business property. 
Defendant and Appellant gave a Warranty Deed to Price Rentals, Inc., a Utah Corporation 
upon the 3rd day of January, 1975 for the property deeded to him upon June 26th, 1957 by 
Plaintiff and Respondent, plus his one-half interest in the business property. 
It should be made clear in this action that the Plaintiff and Respondent and the 
Defendant and Appellant only owned one acre of land, the description of which was set out 
in the Divorce Complaint. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
The parties had agreed to a division of the one acre, but decided to wait until the Decree of 
Divorce became final, so that they could take the real estate as single persons. Upon the 
26th day of June, 1957 Warranty Deeds were signed in the Office of Barclay and Barclay, 
Attorneys at Law for the Plaintiff and Respondent. The Plaintiff and Respondent signed a 
Warranty Deed to the Defendant and Appellant for the land the description of which was 
brought to the Office of Barclay and Barclay by Plaintiff and Respondent. The Defendant Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law Scho l, BYU. 
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and Appellant signed a Warranty Deed to the Plaintiff and Respondent covering the 
property that she was to receive, which description she brought to the Office of Barclay and 
Barclay, her Counsel. Both parties agreed that 2 parcels of the one acre of land were equal 
in value. That Defendant and Appellant take the one parcel of land with 2 small sheds. That 
Plaintiff and Respondent retain that part upon which a duplex was located. At that time 
Plaintiff and Respondent was living in the duplex and rented the other side. The part of the 
acre to the west which is described in the second description of the Warranty Deed signed 
June 26th, 1957 by Plaintiff and Respondent. That said property was appraised by both 
parties as to the value thereof in the sum of $2,000.00. Plaintiff and Respondent sold her 
interest to Defendant and Appellant for $1,000.00. That Plaintiff and Respondent refused 
to sign the Divorce Complaint until she was given the $1,000.00, which she did receive from 
L. J. Barclay, her Counsel. 
The only property left was that of the business rental property on South State Street, 
Midvale, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which was held jointly, each party received 
$175.00 per month as their share of the rentals. 
POINT II 
Attitude of the Court and Counsel from the very Beginning of the alleged trial judge 
Stewart M. Hanson had made up his mind regardless of the evidence to be produced in the 
case. A reading of his memorandum decision, the transcript of the alleged trial, the 
argument for a motion for a new trial and the transcript of the motion for a new trial, will 
bear out this conclusion. Many of the remarks made by Judge Stewart M. Hanson are 
absent from the transcript of the alleged trial and the transcript of the motion for a new 
trial. 
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent refused to cross-examine L. J. Barclay. He 
refused to interview Attorney Robert Van Sciver. He refused to interview L. J. Barclay. He 
refused to check the records of the County Recorder for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
He has used every conceivable statements that are not relevant to this matter. It is a fair 
conclusion from the actions of Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent, that he did not want 
the true facts in this matter. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
1. That the Two (2) Warranty Deeds and the Two (2) Bills of Sale made, executed and 
delivered upon the 26th day of June, 1957 be declared valid, also the agreement be declared 
valid. 
2. That the judgment made and entered by Judge Stewart M. Hanson upon the 25th 
day of May, 1976 be reversed. 
3. That the matter be dismissed. 
Respectuflly Submitted 
Joseph R. Howell 
and 
L. J. Barclay 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
Melvin Naylor 
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